INTO THE AL SHABAAB

Deuteronomy 20:10–12

“When you march up to attack a city,
make its people an
offer of peace. If they accept and open their gates, all
the people in it shall be subject to forced labor and shall
work for you. If they refuse to make peace and they
engage you in battle, lay siege to that city.”

In contemplating the state of our beloved country,  the former “..island of peace in the volatile Great Lakes region of Africa”(Jacqueline Klopp, PhD and Priscah Kamungi,  PhD -Violence and Elections:Will Kenya Collapse?), we must bravely bring to thought matters that may have never troubled us before: matters of warfare, the politics and history of foreign nations, ethnic moral dilemmas, and our real future, rather than our prospective one. The devil lies in the details, and this will be the first in a series of weekly (or more frequent) articles that will bring him to the light, for the education of the ordinary mwananchi, on (what is really going on, who is doing it, and why is it happening) matters Al Shabaab,  Somalia, and the future of Kenya.

PART 1). Introduction: The Basic Military Philosophy (what is really going on?)

A rather recent controversial invention in the bible of Asymmetric warfare (war between belligerents whose relative military power or tactics and strategy differs significantly, in contrast to Symmetric warfare, where they have similar military power and resources, and the war is waged by generally similar tactics),  is a class of warfare that is the quintessence of unconventional warfare.  It is arguably the least studied class of warfare in history,   the most critically challenged by analysts for being an amalgamation of other generations of warfare, and  it is quite obviously, the one which States are least prepared for, despite being the most common in recent years.

The key question one must answer in order to understand deeply this concept of asymmetric warfare is:
if “power,” conventionally understood, conduces to victory in war, then how is the victory of the “weak” over the “strong” explained?

Fourth-generation warfare (4GW ) has been defined by its proponents as a ‘complex, prolonged conflict, in which one of
the major participants is not a State but rather a violent
non-state actor’. It is characterised by direct attacks on the enemy’s culture, including
genocidal acts against civilians,  highly sophisticated psychological warfare, social-economic-political pressure and the use of insurgency and guerrilla tactics, all initiated by the “weaker” party through actions that are often regarded as an “offensive”. The comparatively small-sized non-state combatants often lack a distinctive
hierarchical authority and a formal structure, but compensate for this through formidable adaptability
and flexibility,  technological superiority (in the few instances when they happen to be better funded or equipped), the lack of a main central target to be exploited by the “stronger” side and the ability to keep a low profile when needed.

Unable to withstand direct combat against the centralized target enemy — the State’s security forces — the non-state entity
uses propaganda, re education and indoctrination,  movement-
building, religious fanaticism, secrecy, terror, and confusion to overcome
the technological gap.

They use their technological inferiority to their advantage, targeting the enemy’s vulnerable infrastructure i.e the destruction of major communication centres, multiple electric
lines, roads or water supply systems which they do not
have hence cannot similarly serve as targets. The results of are usually devastating, leading to social instability,  economic crisis and the collapse of economic structures. Mayhem usually ensues.

They may also provoke an incident which could be used
for propaganda purposes, exploiting existing ethnic, political and religious divides within the enemy State, as a tactical distraction from them as they regroup or in order to accelerate the weakening of the the State’s existing government.

They may also resort to other forms of  wartime conduct  prohibited by the
‘laws of war’ (jus in bello), while cognizant of the
enemy State’s inability to do the same for fear of international pressure.

The cumulative psychological impact that this has on the enemy is the creation of the idea within the minds of the  political decision makers
that their goals are either “unachievable or too costly
for the perceived benefit”,

Unlike these complex mechanisms that the non-state combatants employ,  their primary agenda is quite simple: to implement their own government, or to  reestablish an old one over the current ruling power. The main aim is to force the enemy State to expend much needed resources at  in an attempt to establish order and security, in fighting a war that it cannot win , while neglecting other indispensable functions of government and at the expense of restoring it’s dying economy. The consequences
of these are the inevitable
increase in disorder, escalation of insecurity, and the weakening of the enemy State’s defence,   until it surrenders or is overthrown…

Next, Part two: Inside the Al Shabaab: From Godane to Ikrima, the fingers behind the trigger…

By Vasquo Mercer Lordez.